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So You've Married a Mismanager: The Inadequacy
of Louisiana Civil Code Article 2354
So, you've married a mismanager? Oh yes, that's the type.
Spending lots of money on lots of nothing? Investing in recycled
breakfast cereal as the next big thing? I bet when you first started
dating it was refreshingly impulsive-perhaps even charmingly
madcap. What can you do about it now? You could go ahead and
get the divorce. If that's not for you then maybe just a separation
of property, but that won't help the stuff already gone. And then
there's article 2354, oh wait, that won't work either ....
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I. INTRODUCTION
Under Louisiana Civil Code article 2354, a spouse may recover
damages due to the other spouse's fraud or bad faith management
of community property during marriage.' One spouse's poor
management decisions, made without malicious intent but certainly
without thought, are not covered by the duty imposed upon
2spouses during marriage. However, the management standard
imposed upon spouses is heightened as soon as the spouses
divorce. Suddenly, a spouse may be liable for his fault, default, or
neglect. 3  Unlike during marriage, during the interim period
between divorce and court partition of community property, a
spouse may be liable for poor business decisions even without a
showing of malicious intent. Thus, for example, a spouse
investing imprudently in the stock market using community funds
will be liable to the other for damages for substandard investment
decisions made after the divorce but not during marriage.
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2354 (2007).
2. See discussion infra Part II.D.1.
3. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2007).
4. Although no court has dealt with irresponsible or imprudent accrual of
community debt under article 2354, a heightened management standard could
arguably include such action. A newly married couple without many assets to
mismanage may have the ability to incur a large mass of community debt. In
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By imposing a heightened standard after divorce until partition
of community property, the law sets up an artificial distinction
based on a presumption that during the marriage, including the
time up to divorce, a spouse will have the other spouse's best
interest at heart when dealing with community property. This
presumption is not necessarily true and does not take into account
the volatile period leading up to the divorce, a period during which
either spouse may feel ambivalent toward management of
community property.
Not only do the standards imposed during and after the
marriage use a questionable presumption regarding when spouses
stop thoughtfully managing the community property, but the low
standard during marriage is also insufficient when compared to the
management standards imposed upon other relationships
contemplated by the Louisiana Civil Code. For business partners,
mandataries, and curators, the standard imposed is much higher.5
Some critics of raising the management standard in the
marriage context may suggest that courts should not involve
themselves in the intimate workings of domestic relations during
the marriage, but such involvement is already sanctioned by the
Louisiana Civil Code. Article 2355 allows a spouse to obtain
judicial authorization to individually manage community property
that would normally require the concurrence of the other spouse.
6
Further, another community property state, California, has already
addressed the need for a higher management standard during
7marriage and now imposes a fiduciary duty upon spouses.
Raising the standard imposed upon spouses in the management
of community property during marriage would give spouses
experiencing management difficulties an additional option when
dealing with their community property. Allowing spouses an
Louisiana, both the community assets and the community debt will be
considered part of the couple's patrimony. According to comment (c) of
Louisiana Civil Code article 2336 (2007), "The community of acquets and gains
is not a legal entity but a patrimonial mass, that is, a universality of assets and
liabilities."
5. See infra Part III.C.
6. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2355 (2007).
7. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(e) (West 2007).
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option within both marriage and the community property regime
would emphasize the idea that marriage is a long-term investment
and commitment.
Louisiana should raise the duty owed by spouses during
marriage to be commensurate with the duty imposed between
divorce and partition, the standards of care expected of business
partners and mandataries, and the duty imposed upon spouses in
other community property states. Part II of this comment discusses
the history of management of community property in Louisiana,
beginning with the management standard articulated in the original
Louisiana Civil Code and ending with the current management
standard under Louisiana Civil Code article 2354. Part HI
discusses various reasons for moving toward a heightened
management standard, including the need for a continuous
management standard throughout the marriage until partition of
community property and the need to establish consistency with
standards dictated in other relationships of trust. Part IV concludes
the article.
While many of the problems that arise within the community
property system could be avoided if the spouses opted for a
separate property regime, under the default system of community
property, a spouse's management of community property is subject
only to the low standard set forth in article 2354. In order to
recover damages from a spouse during the marriage, the spouse
seeking to recover must meet the high bar of proving fraud or bad
faith on the other's part. This standard is especially low when
considered in conjunction with the management duty imposed
upon spouses during the interim between termination of the
community regime and partition of the community property.
Likewise, the management standard during marriage is insufficient
when compared to standards imposed on other relationships in the
Louisiana Civil Code. For a spouse who has married a
mismanager and wishes to address that mismanagement within
both the marriage and the community property regime, the current




II. HISTORY OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY MANAGEMENT IN
LOUISIANA
Louisiana is a community property state. 8  As such, it
recognizes that both a husband and a wife contribute to their
marriage. This recognition of equally valuable yet different
contributions to the marriage was seen in Louisiana as early as the
eighteenth century through the "custom of Paris." 9  As the
Louisiana Supreme Court explained in West v. Ortego, "one of the
major considerations behind the community property system is to
recognize and reward a wife's industry and labor (or the husband's
.. where the wife may be the principal breadwinner) which may
only indirectly serve to enhance the community financially."' 0 In a
community property regime, each spouse is recognized as "equally
contributing by his or her industry to [the marriage's] prosperity,
and possessing an equal right to succeed to the property after its
dissolution."" Community property states thus recognize that
different, but valuable, contributions are made to the marriage by
both the working and non-working spouse.12 "There is nothing
more fundamental in our law," the Louisiana Supreme Court noted
in 1956, "than the rule of property which declares that this
8. There are nine community property states in the United States:
Louisiana, Arizona, California, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-211 (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 760 (West 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 32-906 (2007); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2355 (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. §
123.030 (2006); N.M. STAT. § 40-3-8 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030
(2007); WiS. STAT. § 766.31 (2007).
9. HARRIET SPILLER DAGGETT, THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM OF
LOUISIANA 162 (La. State Univ. Press 1945) (1931).
10. 325 So. 2d 242, 245 (La. 1975).
11. WILLIAM DEFNIAK & MICHAEL VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY 1-2 (Univ. of Ariz. Press 1971) (1943).
12. Community property based on the equality of the spouses has its roots
in the laws of the Visigoth tribes: "[T]he wife fully shared the danger and
vicissitudes of daily life with her husband .... [T]he mutual loyalty of the
spouses, the mutual sharing of the burdens of marriage-was the operative force
which created a community of goods between the husband and wife." Michael
J. Vaughn, The Policy of Community Property and Inter-spousal Transactions,
19 BAYLOR L. REV. 20, 33 (1967).
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community is a partnership in which husband and wife own equal
shares."' 
3
Recognition of equality is one of many benefits of a
community property system. From a psychological perspective,
the shared ownership of property may in itself lend stability to the
marriage. In Coming Apart: A Prognostic Instrument of Marital
Breakup, John N. Edwards and other sociology professors linked
marital property ownership to marital stability. 14 The acquisition
of property that a state recognizes as community-owned 15 not only
promotes recognition of equality between the spouses but also
promotes marital stability through common ownership. In both
these aspects, the state underscores social beliefs about marriage as
a lasting and joint commitment.
A. Management in 1870 Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 150
Although the community property regime recognizes equality
between the spouses, this equality was, for a time in Louisiana,
undermined by the use of the "head and master" rule. 16 This rule,
existing in tandem with the theory of inherent equality in the
ownership of community property, established a management
scheme for such property. While Louisiana theoretically
recognized both spouses as equals, practically speaking, the
husband was placed in the position of manager of the community
property.' 7  As the manager of the community property, the
husband was deemed head and master of the community property.
The husband's role as head and master resulted in a duty on the
part of the husband to manage the community property
responsibly. Article 271 of the Code Napoleon enforced the
husband's responsibility,' 8 and the idea made its way into the 1870
Louisiana Civil Code as article 150, which read:
13. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 86 So. 2d 169 (La. 1956).
14. John N. Edwards et al., Coming Apart: A Prognostic Instrument of
Marital Breakup, 36 FAM. REL. 168 (1987).
15. "Each spouse owns a present undivided one-half interest in the
community property." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2007).
16. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (1888) (repealed 1980).
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (1888) (repealed 1980).
18. As the Code stated:
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[F]rom the day on which the action of separation shall be
brought, it shall not be lawful for the husband to contract
any debt on account of the community, nor to dispose of
the immovables belonging to the same, and any alienation
by him made after that time, shall be null, if it was proved
that such alienation was made with the fraudulent view of
injuring the rights of the wife. 19
Because the husband was charged with the management of
community property under the head and master doctrine, he owed
a heightened duty to his wife to not alienate community property
after the filing date of an action for separation, if such alienation
was done with a view toward fraudulently injuring his wife. The
husband could do nothing to fraudulently deplete the community
during the interim between filing for separation and court partition
of community property. The remedy for such fraudulent action
was high, since the article dictated that such an alienation would be
deemed a nullity.
Although the duty and the remedy under article 150 were high,
the duty only existed after the institution of separation proceedings.
In Davis v. Davis20 for instance, a former husband sold community
property to a third party purchaser, Miller. Even though the
purchaser was in good faith, the former wife sought to annul the
sale. She argued that the sale was fraudulent, asserting that her
husband knew of her intention to file for divorce, which "prompted
him to hastily dispose of the land to the Millers" in order to destroy
her community interest. 21 While the court noted that these were
suspicious circumstances it refused to annul the sale because the
purchasers were in good faith and the sale took place before a suit
Every obligation contracted by the husband at the expense of the
community, every alienation made by him of immovable property
dependent upon it, subsequently to the date of the order mentioned in
article 238, shall be declared void, if proof be given moreover, that it
has been made or contracted in fraud of the rights of the wife.
CODE NAPOLEON art. 271 (1824).
19. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 150 (1870).
20. 23 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945).
21. Id. at 653.
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for separation or divorce was filed.22 Because the disposition
happened before the institution of formal proceedings to end the
marriage, the husband was not yet subject to scrutiny under article
150.
Thus under article 150, a wife not only had to prove that her
husband had the requisite intent to defraud her, but also that the
sale happened after she filed for divorce or separation. The court
in Davis indicated that if the wife could have made such a
showing, the sale as to third parties would have been a nullity. The
remedy under article 150, then, was nullity rather than the recovery
of damages.
B. Management in 1888 Under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2404
Former Louisiana Civil Code article 150 allowed for the
husband's fraudulent transaction to be deemed null, but the article
was replaced in 1888 with Louisiana Civil Code article 2404,
which no longer allowed an explicit nullity action if community
property was alienated with the fraudulent intent to harm the wife's
23interest. As the article stated,
The husband is the head and master of the partnership or
community of gains .... But if it should be proved that the
husband has sold the common property, or otherwise
disposed of [it by] fraud, to injure his wife, she may have
her action against the heirs of her husband ....24
Although the Louisiana Supreme Court held that under article
2404, the husband as head and master could "administer
[community property] alone and as he please[d], 25 the husband
22. Id. at 654.
23. The court in Hall v. Allred held that the husband did intend "to deprive
plaintiff of her community interest by disposing of property at a time when
dissolution of the community was imminent." 385 So. 2d 593, 597 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1980). Even though the court believed the sale of immovable property from
the husband to his uncle was done in an attempt to deprive the wife of her part
of the community, the sale itself remained valid. Id. Unlike former article 150,
the wife could no longer annul a sale because of her husband's fraudulent intent.
Rather, she only had an action for damages. Id.
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2404 (1888) (repealed 1980).
25. Frierson v. Frierson, 114 So. 594, 595 (La. 1927).
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could not defraud his wife. For example, he could not sell
community property by simulation 26 before filing for divorce and
then reacquire the property after the divorce.
27
The remedy available to a wife changed, but the high duty
imposed by former article 150 upon the husband as manager of the
community property continued under article 2404. But unlike
article 150, article 2404 did not limit the fraudulent action to the
time after filing. The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal
found that a husband breached his duty when three days before the
wife filed for separation, the husband sold by simulation six
community-owned lots to his brother.28 In Oliphint v. Oliphint, the
plaintiff-wife sought an accounting of community assets, asserting
that on the day before suit for separation, her husband withdrew
$5,000.00 from their community bank account and deposited it
into his separate corporation.29 The Louisiana Supreme Court in
that case stated that while the husband could administer the
community assets as he wished during the marriage, the defendant
had "intentionally disturbed, damaged, and diminished the
community estate to plaintiffs detriment" and for that he was
liable to his wife for the amount withdrawn from the community
bank account. 3
0
The court in Oliphint found the husband breached his fiduciary
duty to his wife by intentionally disturbing and damaging
community property, but other courts described the husband's duty
as a fiduciary one stemming from the power imbalance between
the spouses and the husband's position as manager. 3 1 In Lee v. Lee
26. A simulation is defined as "[a] contract [that] by mutual agreement...
does not express the true intent of the parties." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2025
(2007).
27. Luquette v. Floyd, 228 So. 2d 177 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
28. Gay v. Martinolich, 271 So. 2d 689 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
29. 54 So. 2d 18 (La. 1951).
30. Id. at 25.
31. Black's Law Dictionary defines "fiduciary" as:
1. A person who is required to act for the benefit of another person on
all matters within the scope of their relationship; one who owes to
another the duties of good faith, trust, confidence, and candor. 2. One
who must exercise a high standard of care in managing another's
money or property.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004).
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for instance, a wife successfully sought to set aside a community
property settlement based on the fraudulent activity of her
husband.32 The wife asserted that she had made statements that
she was going to leave her husband, and the day after she
physically left the home, her husband removed stock from their
safe deposit box and withdrew money from a community bank
account. 33 The court held that the husband had not discharged his
fiduciary duty to the wife and that the relative positions of power
between the two parties dictated the court's high degree of
scrutiny.
34
However the husband's duty was described, courts looked for
proof of fraud or bad faith when interpreting article 2404 and
determining whether a husband breached his fiduciary duty to his
wife.35 In Thigpen v. Thigpen, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that a wife had an action for damages after her husband
fraudulently disposed of community property. 36 The court felt the
sale was "inspired with hostility" and was done with the
"deliberate intent to injure... [his] wife at a time when dissolution
of the community estate was imminent."
37
The combination of Louisiana Civil Code article 2404, the
head and master scheme, and jurisprudence yielded a fiduciary
duty during the marriage38 as well as a duty to account to the wife
at the end of the marriage. The need for such an accounting arose
32. 38 So. 2d 66 (La. 1948).
33. Id. at 67.
34. Id. at 69.
35. For example, in Burger v. Burger, the fourth circuit held that a husband
could spend his income, which would fall into the community without having to
account to his wife, as long as there was no fraud or intent to injure the wife.
357 So. 2d 1178 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
36. 91 So. 2d 12 (La. 1956). The court noted that the spouses' relationship
was deteriorating rapidly in the year of the sale; the son to whom husband sold
the farmland was not a farmer himself; the husband continued to manage the
property after the sale; and the husband admitted that as between he and his
wife, a "state of animosity existed with all that the word connotes and in its
strongest meaning ...." Id. at 17.
37. Id.
38. Unlike article 150, article 2404 did not limit the fraudulent action to the
time after filing an action for separation. Compare LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 150
(1870), with LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2404 (1888).
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at the end of the marriage when a husband could alienate property
without his wife's consent, making it relatively easy for him to
conceal community property from her.39  The husband's
accounting ensured that all the community property was properly
considered by the court at the time of partition. While both
husband and wife owned the community property, only the
husband had the power to manage that property. Because of the
husband's management power, he owed a fiduciary duty to his
wife.
C. Equal Management Under the 1980 Revision: Louisiana Civil
Code Article 2354
The husband's position as exclusive manager of the community
property did eventually come to an end. In 1980, the matrimonial
regimes articles were overhauled and an equal management system
was introduced.4 ° Under equal management, both husband and
wife are managers of the community property. Louisiana Civil
Code article 2346 allows "either spouse acting alone" to "manage,
control, or otherwise dispose of community property unless
otherwise provided by law," 41 and the comments to that article
state that the provision establishes an equal management system.42
Unlike the head and master rule, in which both spouses owned
community property in indivision but the husband was the
exclusive manager of the property, equal management allows both
spouses to manage community property.
The management duties to be imposed between spouses under
this equal management scheme with regard to community property
were reconsidered during extensive revisions. Included in the
revision was Louisiana Acts number 709, in which former
39. See Hodson v. Hodson, 292 So. 2d 831, 836 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974)
(citing Luquette v. Floyd, 147 So. 2d 894, 900 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963)).
40. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2354 (2007) (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
Shortly after the revision of the matrimonial regimes articles, which discarded
the head and master rule, the United States Supreme Court deemed the provision
unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1980).
41. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 (2007).
42. Art. 2346 cmt. a.
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Louisiana Civil Code article 2404 was used to create article
2354. 43 Article 2354 allowed a spouse to recover damages for the
other spouse's fraudulent or bad faith management of community
property during the marriage.
In addition to considering the duty imposed upon managing
spouses during the marriage, the duty imposed upon spouses
during the period between divorce and partition was considered.
During the revision process, Professor Katherine Spaht advocated
a statutory duty which treated former spouses differently from
ordinary co-owners during the interim between termination of the
marriage and partition of community property, since "former
spouses may feel hostility to each other after legal separation or
divorce." 44 Although such a duty was not imposed in the 1980
revision, Representative Dimos introduced House Bill number
1667 in 1995, which passed as Louisiana Acts number 433, to
"provide for the standard of care regarding former community
property under a spouse's control and the duty to preserve former
community property .... Representative Dimos' bill became
Louisiana Civil Code article 2369.3, which heightened the
management duty between spouses during the period between
divorce and partition of community property.46 Unfortunately, the
duty between managing spouses during the marriage was not
similarly heightened.
D. Current Community Property Provisions in Louisiana: The
Standard Governing Management
Under current law, the management duties imposed upon
spouses depend upon whether the spouses are married or are in the
interim period between termination of the marriage and partition of
community property. During the marriage, Louisiana Civil Code
article 2354 applies and a spouse may only recover damages from
the other spouse upon a showing of bad faith or fraudulent
43. 1979 La. Acts No. 709.
44. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes, 50 LA. L. REV. 293, 302
(1989).
45. 1995 La. Acts No. 433.
46. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2369.3 (2007).
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mismanagement of community property.4 7 After termination of
the marriage but before the partition of community property, a
spouse's management duty is higher than that imposed by article
2354: article 2369.3 applies and a spouse must manage prudently
and preserve all of the community property.
48
1. Management of Community Property During the Marriage
Although current Louisiana law sanctions equal management
of community property, spouses are not free to manage that
property in any way they desire. Louisiana Civil Code article 2354
establishes a duty by one spouse to the other in managing
community property during the marriage. Article 2354 is the
current equivalent of articles 150 and 2404 and explicitly allows a
spouse to recover damages for actions of the other spouse during
marriage only upon a showing of fraud or bad faith.49 Although
the matrimonial regimes articles set forth a management duty not
to act fraudulently or in bad faith, the articles in that section do not
define the terms.
While article 2354 does not define fraud, Louisiana Civil Code
article 1953 states that fraud is "a misrepresentation or suppression
of the truth made with the intention either to obtain an unjust
advantage for one party or to cause a loss or inconvenience to the
other."5° This is a high bar to pass. "At least in Louisiana, the
general assumption is that by virtue of the partnership between
husband and wife during marriage ... management decisions will
be made cautiously and deliberately. . . . [T]he remedies
presuppose rather serious commissions or omissions."
51
In Auger v. Auger, the court found such a serious commission
and awarded damages to the former wife after her husband
fraudulently disposed of community property by selling it to his
47. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2354 (2007).
48. Art. 2369.3.
49. Art. 2354.
50. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953 (2007).
51. Katherine Shaw Spaht, Post-Dissolution Management of Former
Community Property: An Unresolved Problem, 1990 WiS. L. REv. 705, 729
(1990).
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father and brother.52 In finding a fraudulent disposition, the court
considered a number of factors, including the fact that the spouses
were having marital difficulties and were physically separated a
few days before the transfer, the suit for divorce was imminent, the
husband sold the property to his close relatives for cash which was
never paid, and nothing was ever reduced to writing.
53
Unlike the court in Auger, the court in Cabral v. Cabral did not
find proof of fraud. 54  There, a wife asserted that her husband
mismanaged property in Orleans Parish.55 The husband admitted
he could have been more attentive to the management of the
community property, but he also pointed to the large sums of his
separate property invested into the community project.56 The court
refused to find bad faith management or fraud, stating that there
was "simply no evidence to show that Mr. Cabral continued to
impoverish the community or take advantage of it in any way.,
57
During marriage, recovery of damages for fraudulent
mismanagement of community property is difficult to obtain.
Even though the spouse in Auger was able to make an adequate
showing, the court pointed out suspicious circumstances with
particularity. 58  The court in Auger only allowed recovery of
damages after articulating a laundry list of factors, any of which
alone could have indicated the managing spouse's less than sincere
interest in managing the community property.
To recover under article 2354, a spouse can also show the other
spouse's action was in bad faith.59  Although the matrimonial
regimes articles do not define bad faith, comments found within
52. 381 So. 2d 879 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 882.
54. 543 So. 2d 952 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
55. Id. at 954.
56. Id. at 955.
57. Id. See also Pellerin v. Pellerin, 550 So. 2d 1250 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1989), in which a wife was unsuccessful in her attempt to show her husband
mismanaged the stocks of a community-owned laundry machine sales company,
because testimony indicated that it was typical in small family corporations to
not pay dividends on common shares.
58. See supra text accompanying note 57.
59. Black's Law Dictionary defines "bad faith" as "dishonesty of belief or
purpose." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 149 (8th ed. 2004).
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the obligations section of the Louisiana Civil Code,60 which also
make use of the phrase, indicate a definition. The comments to
article 1997 state that "[a]n obligor is in bad faith if he
intentionally and maliciously fails to perform his obligation,"61 and
distinguish between fraud and bad faith. Fraud is "a stratagem or
machination to take unfair advantage of another part"'; bad faith is
"an intentional and malicious failure to perform." 6  Using these
definitions, a spouse who makes a bad or stupid decision will not
violate the standard set forth by article 2354: "Either spouse can do
as he or she will with equal management community property,
subject only to the flimsy limitation that such spouse not defraud
[or act in bad faith vis-A-vis] the other." 63 Further, a duty not to act
in bad faith is not the same as a duty to not use bad judgment: "A
spouse who takes a risk on the stock market may have exercised
bad judgment, but she has not acted in bad faith. '"64
Just as acting with bad judgment will not be considered bad
faith, neither will acting in one's own self-interest. In
MeClanahan v. McClanahan, a husband, during his second
marriage, appointed his children from a previous marriage as
partners in his company. 65 The court found no evidence that this
was done in an attempt to divert money away from the community
and strictly required a showing of bad faith or fraud.6 6  It
explained, "It seems that acting out of self interest is not enough to
constitute fraud or bad faith under Article 2354. Rather, a
subjective element, the intent to injure or the intent to reduce a
spouse's community interest, must be established., 67 Other courts
have also required evidence of the intent to injure the non-
60. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 1756-2324.2 (2007).
61. LA. CW. CODE ANN. art. 1997 cmt. b (2007).
62. Id. at cmt. c.
63. Elizabeth De Armond, It Takes Two: Remodeling the Management and
Control Provisions of Community Property Law, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 235, 262
(1994).
64. Janis Lynn Kile, Management of Community Assets: Incorporeal
Movables, 42 LA. L. REV. 770, 786 (1982).
65. 868 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 5th Cir. 2004).
66. Id. at 858.
67. Id. at 848.
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managing spouse. 68  In order for the non-managing spouse to
recover, he must prove bad faith or fraud.69
During the marriage, and under Louisiana Civil Code article
2354, a spouse must prove fraud or bad faith in the management of
the community property. In short, the spouse must prove
malicious intent. Unlike the duty owed by the husband to his wife
in the days of the head and master scheme, 70 current article 2354
does not impose a fiduciary duty upon the managing spouse.
7 1
Rather than a fiduciary duty or an affirmative duty to act in good
faith, the duty imposed by article 2354 is a "negative duty" not to
act in bad faith. And while good and bad faith make for an
interesting dichotomy, the mandate not to act in bad faith does not
necessarily equal a duty to act in good faith. There is a gray area
between the two poles, and it is in this gray area that the law
allows for concepts like negligence and neglect.73 As Professor
68. See Katz v. Katz, 423 So. 2d 1277, 1279 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982), in
which the court held that the wife did not have a cause of action for
mismanagement of a community-owned furniture store because there was no
evidence of fraud and "no evidence of a disposition of property intentionally
designed to injure the wife by reducing her community interest."
69. In Cooper v. Cooper, the court held that absent the plaintiff-wife
specifically alleging and proving fraud or bad faith management, she could not
hold the husband accountable for a "secret bank account" into which he had
deposited community funds. 619 So. 2d 1210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993).
70. See supra Part II.A-B.
71. To impose a fiduciary duty upon spouses in Louisiana, some argue that
something more than equal management of community property must exist.
One commentator has noted in relation to the current duty:
If a duty of prudent administrator exists, it is because one spouse has
asserted control over the interest of the other spouse and thus
undertaken its management as gestor. The reasons offered in support
of a fiduciary obligation [between spouses] . . . are incorrect. The law
regulating negotiorum gestio applies.
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Matrimonial Regimes, 48 LA. L. REv. 371, 382-83
(1987) (footnotes omitted).
72. Kenneth Rigby, Matrimonial Regimes: Recent Developments, 59 LA. L.
REv. 465, 515 (1999).
73. Black's Law Dictionary defines negligence as:
The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent
person would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that
falls below the legal standard established to protect others against
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Spaht noted, "There is a range of behavior not considered to be
fraudulent or bad faith, yet such conduct is also not 'good faith.'
Therefore, it is clear that the obligation imposed during the
existence of the community is not a fiduciary obligation . . .74
The low standard imposed upon spouses during the marriage to not
act with malicious intent is especially inadequate when considered
contemporaneously with the heightened duty imposed during the
interim period between termination of the community regime and
partition of community property.
2. Management of Community Property Between Divorce and
Partition
Even though a court will only consider a spouse's bad faith or
fraudulent acts of management during the marriage as worthy of
allowing a cause of action for damages, a court will impose a
broader duty of management of community property after the
marriage is dissolved.75 Once the marriage is over, the Louisiana
Civil Code contemplates the court entering the fray and
scrutinizing many more transactions involving community
property. Suddenly, the duty to manage community property is
heightened. The article 2354 responsibility to not act in bad faith
or fraudulently is supplanted by Louisiana Civil Code article
2369.3, which states that "a spouse has a duty to preserve and
manage prudently former community property under his control. 76
The comments to article 2369.3 state that it imposes an affirmative
duty distinguished from the duty imposed upon regular co-
owners. 77 The comments also give insight as to why the duty is
suddenly heightened, indicating that "after the termination of the
community property regime, the law no longer assumes that a
spouse who has former community property under his control will
unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally,
wantonly, or willfully disregardful of other's rights.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1061 (8th ed. 2004).
74. Spaht, supra note 51, at 709.
75. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 2369.1, 2369.3 (2007).
76. LA. CIv. CODE. ANN. art. 2369.3 (2007).
77. Art. 2369.3 cmt. a.
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act in the best interest of both spouses in managing it. ' '78 A spouse
who breaches this affirmative duty is "answerable for any damage
caused by his fault, default, or neglect."
79
The language in article 2369.3, that a former spouse is
"answerable for any damage caused by his fault, default, or
neglect," is very similar to the language used to describe the duty
imposed upon a usufructuary. 80  The usufructuary is also
"answerable for losses resulting from his fraud, default, or
neglect." 81  The Louisiana Supreme Court, in interpreting the
standard to which a usufructuary would be held, stated that the
usufructuary was to take care of the property subject to the
usufruct "as though it were his own., 82 The management standard
imposed upon a former spouse during the period following divorce
but prior to partition under article 2369.3 is just as high as the
standard to which the usufructuary is held. Indeed, a former
spouse must do more. In addition to a spouse's duty to "manage
prudently," he also must account for and preserve former
community property in accordance with articles 2369 and 2369.3.83
During the period between filing for divorce and partition of
community property, the duties imposed upon the managing
spouse are threefold. Two of these duties, (1) to account, and (2)
to preserve, ensure that the community property partitioned is the
same property that existed at the termination of the marriage. By
imposing a duty to account, former spouses have the opportunity to
force disclosure regarding management aspects of former
community property. In effect, one spouse can force the other to
engage in a type of "exit interview" in which the management of
property under his control is documented. The duty to preserve
likewise ensures that the community property remains intact until
78. Id.
79. Art. 2369.3.
80. A usufructuary is a person who has rights to the use and fruits of a thing
while another holds its "naked" ownership. For more information, see LA. CIv.
CODE ANN. arts. 535-629 (2007).
81. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 576 (2007).
82. Bell v. Saunders, 72 So. 727, 730 (La. 1916).
83. LA. CrV. CODE ANN. arts. 2369, 2369.3 (2007). Under article 2369, a
former spouse has a "duty to account." Additionally, under article 2369.3, a
former spouse has both a "duty to preserve" and a duty to "manage prudently."
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partition. Both of these duties result in the former community
property being placed in a type of "stasis." Keeping the former
community property in this sort of stasis reflects the pragmatic
concern voiced in the comments of the matrimonial regimes
articles-that during this period, the law assumes the spouses no
longer have each other's best interests at heart. 84 During the period
between filing for divorce and the partitioning of community
property, spouses presumably will not be thinking primarily about
the good of the community property.
85
The "freezing" of community property through the duty to
account and the duty to preserve not only ensures that spouses do
not dispose of property that should be subject to court partition, but
also results in the managing spouse having no obligation to
increase the former community. Louisiana Civil Code articles
2369 and 2369.3 do not impose a duty upon a spouse to benefit the
former community during the interim. Thus, in Barbin v. Barbin, a
wife asserted that she was entitled to interest that would have been
earned if community funds had been invested during the period
preceding partition.86 The court rejected this argument, stating that
the husband did nothing wrong in "allowing community funds to
be idle prior to the partition." 8 Allowing community funds to be
"idle" in this instance ensured that the community property
remained as it was at the time of divorce until the court had an
opportunity to partition the property.
While the line drawn at filing for divorce is arbitrary, from a
pragmatic perspective, it is the most outwardly visible line to draw.
At the point that a spouse petitions for divorce, the community
assets are preserved until partition. As long as the community
property in existence at the termination of the marriage remains
84. Art. 2369.3 cmt (a).
85. Although an action increasing or benefiting the community during this
interim period would result in an increase in the managing spouse's patrimony,
the law reflects a concern that divorcing spouses will mismanage or deplete
former community property (either out of spite or ambivalence), despite the fact
that such mismanagement or depletion also harms the managing spouse's share
of the former community property.




available for court partition later, a spouse has fulfilled his or her
duty to preserve.88
3. Comparison of the Management Standards During and
After Marriage
When compared to the standard set forth by article 2369.3, the
standard set forth for management of community property during
marriage seems especially low. A look at several cases involving
bad business decisions by spouses reveals the difference between
the standard imposed on a managing spouse during the marriage
and that imposed during the period in between filing for divorce
and the partition of community property.
In Aymond v. Aymond, a husband claimed his wife left the
marital domicile and prematurely cashed in community certificates
of deposit for half a million dollars.89 In doing so, the community
incurred withdrawal penalties. The court declined to award the
husband damages under article 2354, stating that "[a]lthough Mrs.
Aymond's actions were somewhat ill-advised, we do not find they
were fraudulent." 90
On the other hand, in Gibson v. Gibson, the court analyzed
similar facts under article 2369.3 and found that the wife could
recover damages based on her husband's post-divorce
management. 91 After the spouses' divorce, the former husband
withdrew funds from a community retirement plan without the
knowledge or consent of his former wife.92 The withdrawal of the
funds resulted in a twenty percent reduction of the fund by the
88. The duty to preserve imposes upon a spouse the duty to continue the
existence of the formerly community-owned thing in a manner consistent with
its condition during the community. The managing spouse must do what is
necessary to maintain the thing until the court can partition assets. In Bordenave
v. Bordenave, the court reasoned that a former spouse was entitled to
reimbursement of half the mortgage payments made during the interim, because
such payments were necessary to prevent foreclosure on the former community
home. 869 So. 2d 249, 253 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2004).
89. 758 So. 2d 886 (La. App. 3d Cir. 2000).
90. Id. at 891.
91. 692 So. 2d 708 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
92. Id. at 709.
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husband's former employer. 93 The court held that the husband
breached his duty and that under article 2369.3, bad faith was not
required; merely a showing of neglect or that one acted
imprudently was sufficient.
94
Thus, while the wife in Gibson was able to recover because of
her husband's "imprudent" actions under article 2369.3, the
husband in Aymond could not be reimbursed for his wife's "ill-
advised" actions under article 2354. One might attempt to
reconcile the cases by arguing that it is not as great of a decision to
withdraw early from a short-term investment, such as a certificate
of deposit, as it is to withdraw early from a long-term investment,
such as a retirement fund. However, in both cases the managing
spouse withdrew from a community investment and that
withdrawal was characterized as merely a bad business decision.
Only the timing of the bad business decision, and thus which
article dealing with management of community property applied,
dictated whether the spouses were able to recover.
Early withdrawal from a retirement fund is the type of
management decision that affects the community property of
spouses across the economic spectrum. From the least affluent to
the embarrassingly rich, articles 2354 and 2369.3 dictate the ability
to recover damages for mismanagement of extremely common
community assets, such as retirement funds.
As demonstrated in Gibson, when analyzing the duty owed
under article 2369.3 to manage prudently, courts look for a
spouse's fault, neglect, or imprudence. The court affirmed a
finding of imprudent mismanagement in Norman v. Norman.
95
There, the trial court found a "dramatic drop" in the managing
husband's rent collection as well as a failure to list available
apartments for rent or to make "minimal repairs." 96 The trial court
determined "that Mr. Norman breached his duty of prudent
administration by failing to properly manage the properties and
allowing them to deteriorate." 97 Under the heightened standard of
93. Id.
94. Id. at 710.
95. 775 So. 2d 18 (La. App. 4th Cir. 2000).
96. Id. at 21.
97. Id. at 23-24; see also Kyson v. Kyson, 596 So. 2d 1308, 1319 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1991); Smith v. Succession of Smith, 298 So. 2d 146, 148 (La. App. 1st
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management imposed by Civil Code article 2369.3, Mr. Norman
breached his duty to his wife. However, if such actions had taken
place during the community regime and under Civil Code article
2354, no such breach would have been found.
The difference in management duties imposed upon spouses
during marriage and during the interim produces inconsistent
results. The same ill-advised action will not yield recovery during
the marriage but will during the interim period. Such
inconsistency produces illogical results and affects the community
property of all spouses-from those with few assets, such as
retirement funds, to those with many, such as rental properties.
III. MOVING TOWARD A HEIGHTENED MANAGEMENT STANDARD
The management standard imposed upon spouses during
marriage should be raised in order to be consistent with the
standard imposed upon spouses during the period following
termination of the marriage and before partition of community
property. Allowing court involvement during the marriage would
also be consistent with what courts already do when granting
judicial authorization for one spouse to manage community
property that normally would require the concurrence of the other
spouse. Raising the standard during marriage would likewise be
consistent with the standards imposed on other relationships in the
Louisiana Civil Code and the duty imposed upon married spouses
in another community property state, California.
A. The Need for a Continuous Management Standard
Raising the duty imposed on spouses managing community
property during the marriage to the standard imposed during the
interim, the period between termination of the marriage and
partition of the community property, would better fit into the
concept of creating a stasis period between divorce and partition.
Community assets are frozen during this interim through the duty
to preserve and the duty to account, yet management duties are




heightened. Former spouses should be subject to the heightened
management standard throughout the marriage until the partition of
community property, and the duty to preserve and to account
should be added in order to ensure that the community property
that existed at the time of the dissolution of the marriage is the
community property available to the court at the time of partition.
As comparison of the cases indicates, the distance between the
management duty imposed during marriage and that imposed
during the interim is vast.98 Instead, the management standard
imposed upon spouses should be uniform throughout their
relationship up until the final partition of community property.
Allowing such an artificial distinction based on dissolution of the
marriage fails to take into account the period preceding filing for
divorce. Spouses should be held to the same standard throughout
when it comes to management of community property, because it
is impossible for the law to truly determine when the spouses no
longer have each other's best interests at heart. Having the same
management standard throughout would also be simpler on the
spouses themselves, who would be able to continue managing the
property as they were during the marriage rather than suddenly
being subjected to a heightened standard.
Holding spouses to the same management standard throughout
their marriage recognizes the artificial nature of the date spouses
file for divorce. Recognition of some date that marks the end of
the community is necessary for the freezing of community assets
until the time of partition, but it is not necessary for imposing a
management duty. The decision to divorce does not come upon
spouses suddenly; rather, there is a pre-filing period that the
current law does not sufficiently protect.
Regarding this pre-filing period, Lytal v. Lytal is instructive.99
There, the court affirmed the trial court's injunction, which
stopped the husband from disposing of community property during
the interim period between divorce and partition. It found the
husband had a "preplanned divorce strategy" and that he had
engaged in a pattern of preparation for the divorce before filing for
98. See discussion supra Part II.D.
99. 818 So. 2d 111 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2001).
100. Id.
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termination of the marriage.' 0 ' In his concurrence and partial
dissent, Judge Kline quoted the lower court, which had found the
husband's exit strategy to be the "corporate equivalent of a
roughneck's wife cleaning out all the family assets while he's
offshore."'
10 2
Those outside the legal community have also recognized that
spouses engage in preplanning for an imminent divorce. The "pre-
divorce decision period," as one researcher pointed out, "may last
weeks, months, or years."' 1 3  In an article discussing British
families, Robert Chester noted that the "legal duration of marriage
does not properly depict the time which marital unions effectively
endure." 4 Recognizing a period before spouses actually file for
divorce in which separation has already begun, Chester drew a
distinction between the de jure period of the marriage, that which
spans the wedding date to the date of the divorce decree, and the de
facto period, which spans from the wedding day to the date of
separation or break-up of the marriage. 10 5 As he went on to note,
"in the majority of cases there is considerable time lapse between
parting and petitioning .... 106 Chester also pointed out that
spouses could view the period leading up to a divorce very
differently; one spouse may foresee the end of the relationship, and
the other spouse may be oblivious. 107
If there is a long road from marital strife to marital end, it
stands to reason that an unhappy spouse will begin asserting his
identity apart from and possibly against the other spouse before the
marriage legally ends.'08 Raising the management standard during
101. Id at 114.
102. Id. at 116 (Kline, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
the lower court).
103. Kenneth Kressel, Patterns of Coping in Divorce and Some Implications
for Clinical Practice, 29 FAM. REL. 234, 237 (1980).
104. Robert Chester, The Duration of Marriage to Divorce, 22 BRIT. J. SOC.
172, 176 (1971).
105. Id. at 172.
106. Id at 176.
107. "Sometimes also the couple may have asymmetrical attitudes towards
the situation, with one partner regarding the marriage as still existing, and
declining to adopt a pattern of life based on the fact of separation." Id. at 180.
108. See Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV.
957, 957 (1982) ("The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to
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the marriage would protect spouses going down the road toward
divorce. As one author notes in advocating consensus
requirements for all property decisions between spouses, "cruelty
is a part of human nature as well as love, and the family, with its
intense attachments, dependencies, and power imbalances is a
breeding ground for all kinds of private cruelties.' 1°9 Because the
time of true separation is so difficult to define, the law should
protect spouses equally during both marriage and the interim
period between divorce and partition by imposing a continuous
heightened management standard.
While imposition of the law during marriage could be seen as
an impermissible interference and entry into the private realm of
marriage, for spouses headed toward an inevitable divorce, the
concern that spousal litigation will erode and facilitate a
breakdown of trust is misplaced. In these situations, the intimate
trust between the spouses has broken down before the law's
intervention. For spouses who genuinely wish to work through a
property dispute during marriage and do not foresee the end of
their marriage, the concern about litigation widening the breach
between spouses is arguably more appropriate. In these cases,
however, the spouses will be making a diligent effort to mend the
breach caused by a management dispute and will look to the law
for facilitation of that mending. Only in situations in which
spouses are intent on remaining married and one spouse uses the
ability to litigate a greater number of management decisions with
the benefit of hindsight does the concern regarding the limits of
law remain. Despite this concern, in these situations the breach of
trust has happened with or without the law's intervention.
B. Consistency with Court Involvement During Marriage in
General
While critics of imposing a higher standard during the marriage
may argue that the courts should not become involved in the
achieve proper self-development-to be a person-an individual needs some
control over resources in the external environment. The necessary assurances of
control take the form of property rights.").
109. De Armond, supra note 63, at 256.
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spouses' management of community property during the marriage
and that only after the break-down of marriage should courts get
involved in such private disputes, the critics fail to recognize that
the Louisiana Civil Code requires such involvement in other
situations. Louisiana Civil Code article 2355 already contemplates
just such an intervention during the marriage." 0 The article allows
a spouse to petition the court for authorization in order to
circumvent the requirement of concurrence the Code imposes on
particular management decisions.11 Although the article applies
only to situations in which the concurrence of both spouses is
required for certain management decisions, it does indicate a level
of willingness to examine management issues during the marriage
as opposed to after the dissolution of the marriage. Under the
article, a spouse may be able to get judicial authorization through
summary proceeding to act without the other spouse's consent if
the other spouse is refusing arbitrarily and the petitioning spouse
can show that the act would be in the "best interest of the
family."' 112 Such a determination requires the court to scrutinize
the petitioning spouse's desired act and to consider management
decisions affecting community property while the marriage is still
intact. Raising the duty under article 2354 would result in the
same sort of court intervention at the same period of the marriage's
life cycle.
110. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2355 (2007).
111. Id. A spouse must obtain the concurrence of the other spouse in order to
alienate, lease, or encumber community immovables as well as furniture or
furnishings in the family home, "all or substantially all of the assets of a
community enterprise, and movables issued or registered as provided by law in
the names of the spouses jointly." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2347 (2007).
Unless a gift is deemed customary or usual, concurrence is also required for
donations. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2349 (2007). If concurrence is required and
a spouse fails to obtain such concurrence, the transaction is relatively null. LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2353 (2007). While the court will grant the petitioning
spouse authorization, it will not force the refusing spouse to act. In Allen v.
Allen, the court explained, "nothing in this article permits the court to order the
dissenting spouse to agree and comply with the management decisions being




C. Consistency with Standards of Care Imposed by the Louisiana
Civil Code on Other Relationships
In addition to heightening the management standard during
marriage in order to be consistent with the standard imposed
during the period between termination of the marriage and
partition of community property, the standard imposed during
marriage also should be raised to be consistent with standards of
care imposed by the Louisiana Civil Code in other relationships.
The relationships between business partners, curators and
interdicts, as well as mandataries and principals all share the
common thread of being based upon foundations of confidence. In
these relationships, the law expects a certain level of trust to attach.
Similarly, a relationship of confidence and trust should be
presumed between spouses during marriage. Just as the law
protects parties in other relationships of confidence, so too should
the law protect married spouses.
1. Business Partners: A Fiduciary Duty
According to Louisiana Civil Code article 2809, business
partners owe each other a fiduciary duty. 113 As that article states, a
partner "may not conduct any activity ... that is contrary to his
fiduciary duty and is prejudicial to the partnership.""11 4  The
comments to that article further explain this duty, stating, "The
relationship of the partners is fiduciary and imposes upon them the
obligation of good faith and fairness in their dealings with one
another."' ' 15  Further, the same duty that exists during the
partnership is also imposed until the partnership is liquidated; the
law does not heighten the standard after the partnership decides to
dissolve.116
In the Louisiana Civil Law Treatise on Business Organizations,
Glenn G. Morris and Wendell H. Holmes discuss the fiduciary
duty between partners:
113. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2809 (2007).
114. Id.
115. Id. atcmt. b.
116. Id.
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Their duties may be described under generalized headings
of "care," "loyalty," "good faith" and the like, but none of
these generalized headings is much more helpful than the
label "fiduciary" itself in determining the precise content of
a particular, concrete duty to do or refrain from doing some
specific thing. The content and scope of these more
particular forms of duty-the actual duties being enforced
-should depend heavily on the reasonable expectations of
the parties to the relationship.
1 1 7
Whatever the details of a partner's particular fiduciary duty,
however, breach of that duty does not require actual intent to
deceive. In Barksdale v. Lincoln Builders, Inc., the court
remanded and held that limited partners had a cause of action
against general partners for a breach of the general partners'
fiduciary duty after the general partners decided to pay themselves
fees during a period when there was very little positive cash
flow. 18 The court explained:
The standard of a fiduciary's duty to his beneficiary,
depending on the facts of the case, lies somewhere between
simple negligence and willful misconduct or fraud with the
intent to deceive; the actual intent to deceive is not required
where one party is placed in such an advantageous position
to the other." 9
The duty imposed upon partners here is reminiscent of the duty
previously imposed upon the husband when he was head and
master of the community. 2  There, as with the relationship
between partners, the duty arose because one party was in a
position which, if abused, could be used to take advantage of the
other. While the husband is no longer head and master of the
community, under equal management 12 1 the ability to abuse the
power to manage community property still exists. Even though
117. GLENN G. MORRIS & WENDELL H. HOLMES, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS
§ 2.17, in 7 LOuIsIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE (1999) (emphasis in original).
118. 764 So. 2d 223 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2000).
119. ld.at230-31.
120. See supra Part II.A-B.
121. See supra Part II.C.
246 [Vol. 68
COMMENTS
spouses are sometimes referred to as "partners" in marriage, unlike
a real partnership, they do not produce a distinct juridical
person. 122 Despite this difference, the level of confidence present
between spouses in a marriage and partners in a business venture is
strikingly similar; in both relationships, one party depends upon
the other to make decisions affecting both parties' interests. If the
cases arising out of a partner's fiduciary duty during the
partnership were resolved under the standard imposed upon
spouses in the management of community property during the
marriage, however, no partner would be able to recover unless he
or she could prove the other's bad faith or fraud.
2. Mandataries: Prudence and Diligence
Like the duty imposed upon business partners, a duty arising
out of a position of power and trust also is imposed upon
mandataries in Louisiana. 123 Louisiana Civil Code article 3001
states that the "mandatary is bound to fulfill with prudence and
diligence the mandate he has accepted. He is responsible to the
principal for the loss that the principal sustains as a result of the
mandatary's failure to perform."'
124
The standard imposed upon a mandatary is a high one; he
"owes to his principal a duty to act with due care and diligence, a
duty of loyalty to avoid conflicts of interest, and a duty to
account."' 2f While the "duty of loyalty is not directly imposed by
the mandate articles, it is said to derive from the general obligation
of good faith."' 126  As further definition of this duty, Leonard
Oppenheim and Sidney Pugh Ingram refer to the "prudent man
rule,"'127 which originated in the New York case of King v.
122. "A partnership is a juridical person distinct from its partners. . . ." LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2801 (2007).
123. The mandate in the civil law is the equivalent of agency in the common
law.
124. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3001 (2007).
125. Wendell H. Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation,
Mandate, and Agency: A Kommentar on Louisiana's New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV.
1087, 1136 (1999).
126. Id.
127. LEONARD OPPENHEIM & SIDNEY PUGH INGRAM, TRUSTS § 352, in 2
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 357 (1977).
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Talbot.128 In that case, Judge Woodruff held that a trustee should
not have invested in stocks using funds intended for his
beneficiaries. 129 The court held that a trustee could not invest in
risky ventures, even if he would do so with his own money
because of the speculative nature of the investment and the
trustee's primary responsibility to the beneficiaries. 130 As Judge
Woodruff explained, "the trustee is bound to employ such
diligence and such prudence in the care and management, as in
general, prudent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters,
employ in their own affairs."
'1 31
In 1975, the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the
mandatary's duty in Noe v. Roussel. 132  There, the defendant-
mandatary was the sole liquidator of a corporation which owned a
15,000 acre tract of land. Plaintiff-principal sought to rescind
the sale of the tract, asserting that the defendant sold the property
for an inadequate consideration.1 34  The court agreed that the
defendant breached his duty, especially since he failed to have the
property appraised before the liquidation sale.' 35 The Louisiana
Supreme Court willingly held the mandatary to a high standard,
stating that the fiduciary "must zealously, diligently, and honestly
guard and champion the rights of his principal against all other
persons whomsoever, and is bound not to act in antagonism,
opposition or conflict with the interest of the principal to even the
slightest extent.'
136
A mandatary may also breach his duty to his principal by
failing to "act with complete candor . . . ."'37 Like the duty
imposed upon business partners nuanced by the specific
understanding between them, the mandatary's duty to the principal
128. 40 N.Y. 76 (N.Y. 1869).
129. Id. at 89.
130. Id. at 86, 89.
131. Id. at 85-86.
132. 310 So. 2d 806 (La. 1975).
133. Id. at 808.
134. Id. at 809.
135. Id. at 819.
136. Id. at 818-19.
137. Woodward v. Steed, 680 So. 2d 1320, 1327 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1996),
writ not considered, 684 So. 2d 411 (La. 1996), and aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
and rendered, 715 So. 2d 629 (La. 1998).
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is further colored by the particular relationship between the parties.
Courts look to the precise nature of the relationship between
principal and mandatary to determine exact duties.1 38 Whatever
the particularized nature of the duty between mandatary and
principal, that duty stems, like the duty between business partners,
from a presumption of trust. In Gerdes v. Estate of Cush, the court
explained the duty of the mandatary as "loyalty which results from
the position of trust . . 139 The Louisiana Supreme Court also
characterized the relationship as one arising out of the trust
between principal and mandatary in Cuggy v. Zeller.
140
Just as the duty between mandataries and principals arises out
of the trust between the two parties, so too should the duty one
spouse owes the other in the management of community property
during the marriage be heightened because of the trust between
husband and wife. While the comments to the current matrimonial
regimes articles explicitly state that spouses are not mandataries of
one another, 14 1 cases involving old article 2404 routinely defined
the relationship between husband and wife as a fiduciary one.142
Indeed, the imposition of a fiduciary duty upon spouses is not
contingent on the characterization of the spouses as mandataries of
one another. In order to be consistent with the standard imposed
upon mandataries, however, the duty found in article 2354, to not
act in fraud or bad faith when managing community property,
should be raised.
3. Curators: The Highest Duty
The duty owed between spouses should be raised in order to be
consistent with the duty imposed upon business partners and
mandataries, but the duty under article 2354 should not rise to that
imposed upon the curator. Perhaps the highest duty of care
imposed upon anyone in the Louisiana Civil Code is the one owed
138. See La. Hand & Upper Extremity Inst., Inc. v. City of Shreveport, 781
So. 2d 695, 698 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2001); Abrams v. Succession of Abrams, 252
So. 2d 705, 707 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
139. 953 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1992).
140. 61 So. 209, 210 (La. 1913).
141. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2346 cmt. b (2007).
142. See supra Part II.B.
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by the curator to her interdict. Louisiana Civil Code article 392
states that "[i]n discharging his duties, a curator shall exercise
reasonable care, diligence, and prudence and shall act in the best
interest of the interdict."1 43 The comments to the article go on to
state that the "curator should consider the interdict's preferences,
religious beliefs, and values to the extent known to the curator."'
144
In reviewing a curator's decision, courts will analyze deeply
the particular relationship involved. In Interdiction of Rodrigue, a
husband acting as his wife's curator after she was interdicted due
to Alzheimer's and other forms of dementia sought to relocate her
to a care facility in Texas. 145 The court allowed the relocation,
believing that it would be in the wife's best interest even though
her daughters, who were opposed to the move, lived in
Louisiana. 146 The Texas facility was better; it offered more and
cost less. Even though the wife's daughters lived in Louisiana, the
court found they were not part of her daily life. 147 In making its
decision, the court stated "[c]learly, a curator at all times must act
exclusively in the best interest of the interdict."
148
Not only are courts willing to analyze deeply what is in the best
interest of the interdict in situations such as the one in Rodrigue,
they also impose upon a curator the duty to gain knowledge of
important happenings in the interdict's affairs. In Hebert v. Wise,
the plaintiffs sought to annul a tax sale of immovable property,
asserting that they did not receive notice of the sale. 149 The owner
of the property had been interdicted, but there was nothing in the
conveyance records indicating as much. 150 The court held that it
fell to the curator to know of the sale and that he should have made
an effort to obtain the interdict's mail.151 According to the court, if
he had fulfilled his duties, the curator would have "take[n] steps to
receive the interdict's mail and learn of proceedings pending
143. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 392 (2007).
144. Id. at cmt. c.
145. 927 So. 2d 421 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2005).
146. Id. at 426.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 423.
149. 666 So. 2d 409 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995).




against the interdict's property . I... 52 The court set forth an
extremely high standard, stating that a "curator at all times must
act exclusively in the best interest of the interdict. He must
scrupulously administer the affairs of the interdict and explore
every avenue available for fulfilling his duty to the interdict."' I
3
To impose a standard as high as the one imposed upon curators
in the context of management of community property during
marriage would not be feasible. Spouses, as owners of an
undivided half interest in the community property, 154 necessarily
cannot act in the best interest of the other spouse exclusively.
While there is logic behind imposing such a high duty upon
curators, this logic does not translate to duties between spouses.
The duty imposed upon curators is high because interdicts have
been deemed by the court "unable consistently to make reasoned
decisions regarding the care of [their] person or property, or to
communicate those decisions . . . ,,'55 The interdict cannot be
expected to protect his own interests in the least; he is totally at the
mercy of the curator. This transcends the relation of trust seen
between business partners, mandates and principals, and spouses; it
instead becomes a relationship of dependence. Spouses do not and
should not depend upon one another in this way. Spouses, as
owners of their community property, should be capable of making
reasoned management decisions.
Therefore, while the standard imposed upon spouses in the
management of community property should never rise to the level
of that imposed upon curators, it should be raised to correspond
with the duty imposed upon partners and mandataries. These
relationships share a common thread of trust and confidence. In all
except the relationship between spouses, the law recognizes that
this trust and confidence carries with it the potential for abuse and
indiscretion and imposes fiduciary duties in recognition of that
risk. Although some critics argue that raising the standard during
marriage to a level consistent with the standards defined in other
relationships would result in an insurmountable flood of litigation,
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2336 (2007).
155. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 389 (2007).
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one community property state, California, has raised the
management standard between spouses during marriage and has
not experienced such inundation.
D. Consistency with California: A Fiduciary Duty
It is possible and practical for Louisiana to recognize the
potential for abuse and indiscretion and to impose a heightened
standard during the marriage. Other community property states
have led the way in requiring such a duty.' 56 California sets forth
an explicit duty between spouses during marriage: "Each spouse
shall act with respect to the other spouse in the management and
control of community assets and liabilities in accordance with the
general rules governing fiduciary relationships."' 157 California law
further explains, "This confidential relationship imposes a duty of
the highest good faith and fair dealing on each spouse, and neither
shall take any unfair advantage of the other. This confidential
relationship is a fiduciary relationship subject to the same rights
and duties of non-marital business partners."' 158 California, then,
imposes not only a fiduciary duty, but also defines that duty as
subject to the same dynamics as business partners. It has been a
long road to California's articulation of this standard. While
California started out in the same place as Louisiana, the law in
California has ended up much more progressive.
1. Development of a Need for an Articulated Standard
California, like Louisiana, began with a community property
management scheme "largely characterized by male management.
Like under Louisiana's head and master rule, 160 the husband was
156. Although Wisconsin also imposes a higher duty between spouses in the
management of community property-that of "good faith"-the adoption of this
standard is new and does not yet add much insight. WIS. STAT. § 766.15 (2007).
157. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100(e) (West 2007).
158. CAL. FAM. CODE § 761(b) (West 2007).
159. Carol S. Bruch, Protecting the Rights of Spouses in Intact Marriages:
The 1987 California Community Property Reform and Why It Was So Hard to
Get, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 731, 732 (1990).
160. See supra Part II.A-B.
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deemed to stand in a fiduciary relationship to his wife. 16 1 In
determining what this fiduciary duty entailed, California courts
considered the confidential nature of the relationship between
spouses. In Fields v. Michael, for example, the husband allegedly
made large, clandestine gifts of community property to fictitious
people.'16 As the court explained, "It is clear that, being a party to
the confidential relationship of marriage, the husband must, for
some purposes at least, be deemed trustee for his wife in respect to
their community property."' 163  The court thus analyzed the
management duty of the husband to his wife through recognition of
the confidential relationship between the spouses.
California courts continued to recognize the confidential nature
of the spouses' relationship but questioned whether a husband's
fiduciary duty arose from both this confidence and the husband's
position as manager of the community property. In Vai v. Bank of
America National Trust and Savings Association, a widow sought
to rescind a property settlement agreement, asserting that her dead
ex-husband had fraudulently failed to inform her of the actual
value of their community property. 164 The court, in discussing the
duties the decedent owed to his wife, stated that those duties arose
from the husband's management and control of the property and
distinguished these duties from those arising purely out of the
confidential nature of the relationship between the two. 16 5 One
judge dissented from the majority opinion in Vai, disagreeing with
such a distinction and characterizing the fiduciary relationship
between spouses as a function of both the confidential relationship
between them as well as the fact that one was in control of the
community property. 166  In his view, "When a confidential
relationship exists, the spouses are held to a very high degree of
fiduciary duty."'
' 67
Despite the disagreement regarding the source of husband's
fiduciary duty, the court in Vai noted the similarity between
161. See Fields v. Michael, 205 P.2d 402, 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949).
162. Id. at 404.
163. Id. at 405.
164. 364 P.2d 247 (Cal. 1961).
165. Id. at 252.
166. Id. at 259 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
167. Id.
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dissolution of a partnership and dissolution of a marriage and held
that whatever the management duty of the husband, the rules
governing that duty "should be no fewer or less rigorous than those
imposed upon business partners."'
168
Other California cases relied on Vai to distinguish the
husband's fiduciary duty arising from his management of
community property from the confidential relationship between the
spouses. In one case, the court found that while the husband, as
manager of the community property, owed a fiduciary duty to his
wife, that duty was not increased because of the existence of a
confidential relationship.' 69 In Marriage of Modnick, the court
held that a husband committed fraud when he failed to disclose the
existence of community property and took deliberate steps to
conceal the property.' 70 The court seemed to find the husband's
duty as arising from neither his management position nor the
confidential nature of marriage but rather from both. The "duty
stem[med] in part from the confidential relationship. It also
[arose] from the fiduciary relationship that exist[ed] between the
spouses with respect to the control of community property."'
7 1
Regardless of whether California courts viewed the duty as
stemming only from the husband's position as manager or from his
position as manager as well as the confidential nature of marriage,
courts imposed a duty upon the managing spouse and were willing
to recognize marriage as a confidential relationship. Disagreement
about the source and nature of this duty indicated a need for an
explicit standard.
2. The Standard Imposed Upon Managing Spouses
While courts imposed some sort of duty upon the managing
spouse of community property, the question arose as to where that
duty came from and exactly what it entailed. In 1986, Senator
Lockyer introduced Senate Bill 1071 at the request of the
California Commission on the Status of Women, whose articulated
goal was to "set a standard for married partners requiring the same
168. Id. at 253 (majority opinion).
169. Jones v. Kauffmann, 71 Cal. Rptr. 10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
170. 663 P.2d 187 (Cal. 1983).
171. Id. at 191 (citations omitted).
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kind of honesty and openness in dealing with property and finances
during the marriage that society demands of business partners."'172
Although this sort of standard--one compared to the duties owed
by business partners-had been established by prior jurisprudence,
the Commission sought to set out such a duty explicitly.' 73 As one
proponent of an articulated and explicit standard noted, "it reduces
the incentive to divorce as a solution to problems of property
management. . . .California's recognition that divorce is not
necessarily the answer for many couples with financial disputes
reflects what may be a more realistic appraisal of both [marriage
and divorce]." 74
The amendment set forth an explicit duty of good faith,175 and
in Marriage of Baltins, the court had an opportunity to discuss this
standard."' In Baltins, a wife successfully sought to set aside
property and support agreements on the grounds of duress, which
the court referred to as "psychological coercion," after her husband
threatened her with bankruptcy and no contact with their child. 177
As the court explained, "[e]ach party is bound in transactions with
the other to the highest and best of good faith and is obligated not
to obtain and retain any advantage over the other resulting from
concealment or undue pressure."' '17
8
In 1991, the California Third Circuit Court of Appeal again
used the mandate that a spouse act in good faith in the management
and control of community property to find that a husband had
abused his management right and owed his wife reimbursement. 179
During the separation period, a community-owned company had
paid "the insurance, maintenance, and principal and interest
payments" on a new Porsche as well as other personal expenses
172. Bruch, supra note 159, at 736.
173. Id. at 731.
174. Id. at 761.
175. "Each spouse shall act in good faith with respect to the other spouse in
the management and control of the community property in accordance with the
general rules which control the action of persons having relationships of
personal confidence ...." Id. at 763.
176. 260 Cal. Rptr. 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
177. Id. at 417.
178. Id.
179. In re Marriage of Czapar, 285 Cal. Rptr. 479 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
2007] 255
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
including meals and vacations.1 80  Additionally, the company
"hired" the husband's new girlfriend as a marketing director,
despite the fact that she had no experience.'
In 1992, an amendment changed the California duty from one
of good faith to a fiduciary duty.'82 As one court noted, good faith
had no definite meaning and the fiduciary duty imposed would be
higher than a duty to act in good faith. 183 Courts imposed a duty of
full disclosure based on the managing spouse's "superior position"
to obtain information regarding the community asset. 184  In
Marriage of Walker, the court held that a wife would have
breached her duty of disclosure under the new, higher standard
when she failed to tell her husband about withdrawals from a
community IRA and the subsequent tax consequences of those
withdrawals. 85 However, the duty of disclosure imposed by the
amendment was not retroactive.186
After 1992, the duty owed between spouses under the new
amendment was also described as a "reciprocal fiduciary duty."' 187
In changing the management duty owed between spouses from one
of good faith to a fiduciary duty, the California legislature raised
the duty and imposed a standard even further from that imposed
upon spouses in Louisiana.
3. Relation to Louisiana
The trajectory of California in defining and refining the duty
owed between spouses lends insight into how Louisiana should
redefine its standard. California and Louisiana started from the
same point, with both granting management power over
180. Id. at 484.
181. Id.
182. In 1994, section 5125 was repealed and replaced with California Family
Code article 1100, which was merely a continuation of section 5125 without
substantive change. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1100 (West 2007).
183. In re Marriage of Reuling, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 732 (Cal. Ct. App.
1994).
184. In re Marriage of Brewer & Federici, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 849, 858 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2001).
185. 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
186. Id. at 339-40.
187. In re Stanifer, 236 B.R. 709, 719 n.12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1999).
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community property to the husband and each looking to the other's
jurisprudence for guidance.' 88 Legal developments in Louisiana
did not go unnoticed by California courts. As Harriet Spiller
Daggett noted, "[t]he community regime of the State of Louisiana
bears a close resemblance to that of California .... The courts of
California have cited Louisiana cases in their decisions with some
frequency ... ,,1 89 While both states subsequently established
equal management, California has moved further down the path of
recognizing that some sort of affirmative duty during marriage
should be imposed upon both spouses. As California courts have
recognized, the marital relationship is a relationship of confidence.
A function of this confidential relationship should be a higher
management duty, something more demanding than that currently
found in Louisiana Civil Code article 2354. A spouse in Louisiana
who makes expensive and spontaneous purchases with community
funds or who gambles on risky stocks with those funds would not
be held liable, but a spouse engaging in the same activities under
California law could be held liable. In allowing a spouse to
recover under such circumstances, California law sends a positive
message about the responsibilities marriage carries with it and the
importance of considering the other spouse's community interest.
E. Recognizing the Psychology Behind Management Duties
Raising the standard during marriage in Louisiana would allow
spouses an additional option when dealing with property disputes
that do not constitute fraud or bad faith. Spouses unhappy with
their partner's management of community property during the
marriage currently have limited options under the Louisiana Civil
Code. Perhaps the most obvious option is divorce, which would
188. See supra Parts II.A-B, III.D.1.
189. DAGGETT, supra note 9, at 175. Similarly, the Louisiana Supreme
Court made use of California jurisprudence when defining the fiduciary duty
owed by husband to his wife under Louisiana Civil Code article 2404 (2007).
Quoting a California case, the court noted that "the fiduciary duties and rules
governing their performance by a husband should be no fewer or less rigorous
than those imposed on business partners." Pitre v. Pitre, 172 So. 2d 693, 695
(La. 1965) (quoting Vai v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 364 P.2d 247,
253 (Cal. 1961)).
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eventually result in a partition of community property and a
heightened standard of care in the management of community
property during the interim period between termination of the
marriage and partition. For some couples, however, community
property disputes do not bring with them the death knell of the
marriage itself. For couples with management problems who wish
to remain married, the law sets forth the option of a judgment of
separation of property. 1
90
Louisiana Civil Code article 2374 allows broadly for a
judgment of separation of property "when the interest of a spouse
in a community property regime is threatened to be diminished by
the fraud, fault, neglect, or incompetence of the other spouse, or by
disorder of the affairs of the other spouse .... ,,191 This standard is
broader than that imposed by article 2354; however, a judgment of
separation of property necessarily carries with it the dissolution of
the community property regime, and such a judgment only affects
future management of property. For spouses who wish to either
continue their marriage within the community property regime or
who seek to address past management decisions, Louisiana Civil
Code article 2354 is the only resort. This article, as previously
discussed, carries with it the difficult burden of showing malicious
intent. 192
When California researchers advocated the inclusion of an
affirmative management duty between spouses during the
marriage, one strong argument was that doing so would allow
spouses to deal with property disputes without divorcing. As one
commentator noted, not allowing spouses a remedy during
marriage "removes from them . . . the option of limited
warfare.' ' 193 While providing such a remedy within the marriage
may not be the most pursued option, "a system that guarantees
relief only in the divorce court surely enhances marital
breakdown."'' 94
190. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2374 (2007).
191. Id.
192. See supra Part II.D.
193. Bruch, supra note 159, at 739.
194. Carol S. Bruch, Management Powers and Duties Under California's




Although the concerns voiced by advocates in California may
not resonate as forcefully in Louisiana given the possibility of a
judgment of separation of property,195 these concerns speak to a
deeper issue about how courts, the legislature, and society view
marriage and the responsibilities that go along with it. Law
certainly has some ability to influence social behavior, and the law
can be viewed as both a reflection and a promoter of certain social
policies. As Professor Karl Llewellyn noted, "It is Law which sets
a goal, contains a threat, and urges to a process . . . . To deny
power to it in producing some of what it symbolizes would be to
deny power to the flag or the Constitution in producing national
feeling and unity."'196 Because of the law's power in setting goals
and urging processes, legislators in particular should be highly
aware of the social messages laws send. 1
97
The messages that laws concerning marriage send should be of
particular concern, because they affect so many people and
because they have "an important bearing upon how society
understands marriage ... ,,98 Those who are not legally
sophisticated enough to know about other aspects of the law still
may have first-hand experience with the realm of family law.
Even more importantly, many couples may enter into marriages in
Louisiana unaware of the legal regime of community property
suddenly and automatically imposed upon them. Legally
sophisticated couples may avoid the management scheme imposed
by articles 2354 and 2369.3 by opting out of the community
property regime, but many couples may marry without any
awareness of the legal regime of which they are automatically a
part.
195. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2374 (2007).
196. Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce, 32 COLUM. L. REV.
1281, 1302 (1932).
197. See Sean E. Brotherson & Jeffrey B. Teichert, Value of the Law in
Shaping Social Perspectives on Marriage, 3 J.L. & FAM. STUDIES 23, 33 (2001)
("In a democratic society, the law articulates agreed upon rights and moral
obligations that serve as tools of social and moral persuasion and provide
direction for individual conduct to members and leaders of society.").
198. Id. at 36. See also Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of
Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 98 (2004) ("[T]o the extent that law can
affect social understandings, marital law is at the center of public awareness and
debate.").
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While raising the standard between spouses in Louisiana could
be analogized to a similar duty seen between business partners,
carrying this analogy too far may have dangerous consequences.
Spouses, unlike business partners, do not form a separate legal
entity through their marriage; rather, they become owners of the
community property in indivision. To require a standard exactly
the same as that imposed on business partners would send the
message that a spouse could view their mate as a professional
manager; such a standard "obliterates the important distinction
between professional managers, who are paid for their
management, and active spouses...."199
However, if we wish to promote marriage as a long-term
investment, spouses should be able to deal with property disputes
within both the marriage and the community property regime. As
the Louisiana Supreme Court noted in the context of allowing
judicial establishment of a separate property regime, article 2374
enables a "spouse to terminate the community regime without
having to end the marriage, thereby protecting the sanctity of the
family unit, evidently one of the goals of the legislature .... ,200
After the termination of the marriage there is, unsurprisingly,
much less chance of reconciliation. As one researcher noted,
"[t]here is likely to be a precipitous drop in the probabilities of
reconciliation of an estranged couple once the state has formally
dissolved the marriage.', 20 1  Not only is there much less of a
likelihood of reconciliation after formal dissolution of the
marriage, but many couples also regret divorce. In one study,
"[flully 70% of the wives and 60% of the husbands said that the
[now divorced] spouse was the first person they would contact in a
personal crisis and that the divorce ha[d] either been a mistake or
that they should have tried harder to resolve their differences. '" 20
2
199. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 198, at 132.
200. Pan Am. Import Co. v. Buck, 452 So. 2d 1167, 1170 (La. 1984).
201. Dorothy M. Stetson, The Effects of Laws on Divorce in American States,
37 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 537 (1975).
202. Kenneth Kressel, Patterns of Coping in Divorce and Some Implications
for Clinical Practice, 29 FAM. REL. 234, 235 (1980). Further, this regret did not
dissipate quickly: "[T]wo years later one-fourth of the women and one-fifth of
the men still expressed strong regret about the divorce." Id.
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Any preventative legislation that can be proposed may allow a
potentially divorcing couple another option. Introducing a
heightened standard sends the message that marriage is a
commitment. Any way of encouraging people to deal with marital
problems without resorting to divorce should be favored by the
law. Indeed, it is this spirit of teamwork that underlies the regime
of community property in the first place.
IV. CONCLUSION
The management duty imposed upon a spouse during the
marriage, to not act fraudulently or in bad faith, is simply too low.
While it is logical to impose additional duties on spouses upon
termination of the marriage, specifically, a duty to preserve and a
duty to account in order to ensure the court's ability to partition the
entirety of the community property, no such reason exists for
suddenly heightening the duty one spouse owes the other in
management of that property. Moreover, the duty imposed upon
spouses during the marriage is especially low when compared to
the duties imposed upon business partners, mandataries, and
curators-all relationships which are based, like marriage, on trust
and confidence.
While Louisiana and California answered management
questions similarly at first, California has ended up in a much
better place, and Louisiana should consider following suit. Finally,
lawmakers should be aware of the social messages the law sends
and shape laws to reflect an understanding of marriage as a long-
term investment and commitment. Louisiana should raise the duty
owed by spouses during marriage to be more closely aligned with
the duty imposed between divorce and partition, the standards of
care expected of business partners and mandataries, and the duty
imposed upon spouses in other community property states.
Kelly Kromer Boudreaux*
* I would like to thank Professor Andrea Carroll for her invaluable help
with this article-I could not have wished for a better advisor. I would also like
to thank my family, especially Mitch, for unwavering support and faith in me.
20071

